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Economic Freedom in the Early 21st Century: Government 
Ideology Still Matters 
 
 
Kai Jäger 
 
 
 
 
 
SUMMARY 
 
Empirical studies show that government ideology has hardly influenced welfare expenditures 
since the 1990s, casting doubt on the general ability of national governments to design 
economic policies according to their programmatic appeals. This study takes a comprehensive 
view on policy-making by using a modified version of the Fraser institute’s Economic Freedom 
of the World Index: I focus on the aspects of economic freedom that provoke party polarization 
and that national governments are capable to influence. The results suggest that government 
ideology still matters in the early 21st century: The empirical analysis of 36 OECD or new 
European Union member states from 2000 to 2012 shows that left-wing governments are 
associated with significantly lower economic freedom. Economic freedom continues to be the 
guiding principle that divides left and right in economic policy-making because the left still 
promotes relatively higher levels of far-reaching government spending and regulation.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Economic policies have always received a great deallot of public and scientific attention. 
Intellectuals, journalists, politicians, and citizens frequently disagree about the desired size and 
scope of government. The dispute on economic policies is often reflected by party 
polarizationbased on different ideological convictions that party competition often reflects: : 
Left-wing parties prefer an activist state which would aim to rectifythat reduces economic 
inequality through regulation and redistributive policies. Right-wing parties, byin contrast, 
advocate a free-market economy with restrictions on state intervention to avoid market 
distortions. 
But the established polarization between left and right on economic policies has recently 
been called into question. Rodrik (2011) argues that government ideology retreats to the 
background because of external constraints such as globalization, which would subordinate 
democratic governance. Iversen and Soskice (2015) disagree, maintaining that national 
governments still have the authority to shape their economies on predictable partisan lines, but 
the declining class cleavage forces them to adoapt their policy stances in order to appeal to a 
wider audience.  
In the OECD, Tthe empirical evidence is mixed in the OECD. Some studies show that 
the partisan effect disappears for some areas, particularly for welfare spending (Garrett and 
Mitchell 2001; Huber and Stephens 2001; Kittel and Obinger 2003; Potrafke 2009; Kwon and 
Pontusson 2010; Herwartz and Theilen 2014), while it remains strong significant for market 
regulation and privatization (Bortolotti and Pinotti 2008; Iversen and Stephens 2008; Potrafke 
2010a; Obinger et al. 2014). 
The previous studies have mostly focused on selected areas of economic policy-making 
in order to reach their conclusions on the influence of government ideology. I use the Fraser 
institute’s Economic Freedom of the World (EFW) Index to provide a unified measurement for 
many aspects of economic policies.  
The EFW Index measures a country’s economic freedom for 42 variables, which are 
combined to form five distinct policy areas (Gwartney et al. 2014). In order to study the 
influence of government ideology, I only include those policy areas in the index that provoke 
partisan disagreement and that are controlled by the national government. The result is a 
modified EFW Index that consists of all policy-areas for which political economists discuss the 
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role of government partisanship: Government expenditures, transfers, subsidies, privatization, 
government investment, income and payroll tax policies, and the regulation of labor and 
business.  
Based on theis modified EFW Index, this studyI wants to investigate the following 
question: 
Are left-wing governments more active in restricting economic freedom? 
The empirical analysis is based on aA time-series cross-sectional analysis for 36 OECD 
or new European Union member states during over the period of 2000- to 2012. The findings 
suggest shows that government partisanship still plays an important role in designing economic 
policies: Left-wing governments are significantly more likely than right-wing administrations 
to restrict economic freedom than right-wing governments.  
 
II. DOES GOVERNMENT IDEOLOGY STILL MATTER? 
II. 1. The classic partisan hypothesis  
The polarization of political parties across a programmatic left-right dimension is 
constitutive for historical cleavage theorists and for spatial theorists of party competition 
(Kitschelt 2000: 846). In both traditions, government accountability and responsiveness arise 
from implementing the economic policies that the public desires. If parties polarize and offer a 
distinctive ideological program, voters are supposed to have a clear choice at the ballot-box. 
Voters could use ideologies and party labels as a shortcut to reduce information cost and may 
still reach rational decisions (Lupia and McCubbins 1998).1  
Given the importance of partisan differences for democratic legitimacy, scholars have 
continuously evaluated how parties differ across the left-right continuum. Hibbs (1977) argues 
that left-leaning governments prefer reducing unemployment while a right-wing government 
would opt for price stability, assuming a politically exploitable Phillips curve trade-off between 
unemployment and inflation. Studies show that left-wing governments have expanded the scope 
and expenditures of the welfare state up until the 1980s (Esping-Andersen 1985; Hicks and 
                                                          
1 For a critical discussion of how partisanship could lead to biased information processing instead of rational 
decisions, see Friedman (2006) and Murakami (2008). 
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Swank 1992; Huber et al. 1993; Hicks 1999; Iversen and Cusack 2000). The classic partisan 
hypothesis suggests that a left-wing government implements expansionary fiscal and monetary 
policies to decrease unemployment, whereas a right-wing counterpart prefers lower inflation 
and implements restrictive fiscal and monetary policies. 
 
II. 2. Government ideology in an era of austerity and globalization 
The classic partisan hypothesis has come under attack by newer empirical findings. They 
suggest that the partisan effect on welfare expenditures has disappeared since the 1990s (Garrett 
and Mitchell 2001; Huber and Stephens 2001; Kittel and Obinger 2003; Potrafke 2009; Kwon 
and Pontusson 2010; Herwartz and Theilen 2014).  
The literature provides several explanations for the disappearing partisan effect, 
highlighting the rise of economic constraints, such as the shift to a postindustrial economy 
(Iversen and Cusack 2000), an aging population (Tepe and Vanhuysse 2009), and expanding 
international competition through globalization (Frieden and Rogowski 1996; Rodrik 2011). 
Economic constraints would force leftist governments to refrain from further expanding the 
welfare state, but popular support for the existing welfare state would also restrict the efforts of 
right-wing governments to cut back on welfare benefits in the “era of new politics” (Pierson 
1996, 2001). 
But the influence of external constraints on policy-making should not be 
overemphasized. Globalization leads to increasedfosters international competition, economic 
integration and mobile capital markets, but the development has not triggered a race-to-the-
bottom of welfare spending, taxation, or labor market regulation (Schulze and Ursprung 1999; 
Dreher 2006a; Dreher et al. 2008; Plümper et al. 2009; Potrafke 2010b, Potrafke 2015). 
Different outcomes in economic policy-making can be reliably linked to government 
ideology in the OECD (Boix 1998; Korpi and Palme 2003): Left-wing governments tend to 
enact more protective labor market regulation (Botero et al. 2004) and spend more on work 
training (Iversen and Stephens 2008). By contrast, right-wing governments are relatively more 
supportive of deregulating product markets (Potrafke 2010a) and privatization (Bortolotti and 
Pinotti 2008; Obinger et al. 2014). 
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External constraints have certainly affected policymaking and party competition. But it 
remains questionable whether they undermine governments’ general ability to shape the 
economy according to partisan goals. 
 
III. DRAWING A MORE COMPREHENSIVE PICTURE: ECONOMIC FREEDOM 
AND GOVERNMENT IDEOLOGY 
III. 1. Why economic freedom is a guiding principle for party competition  
The previous discussion has shownsuggests that it is insufficient to focus on only one or 
a few aspects of policy-making in order to evaluate the partisan hypothesis. This section 
suggests that economic freedom is a comprehensive concept that accounts for existing partisan 
differences in economic policy making. 
The underlying concepts of economic freedom are “(1) personal choice, (2) voluntary 
exchange coordinated by markets, (3) freedom to enter and compete in markets, and (4) 
protection of persons and their property from aggression by others” (Gwartney et al. 2014: 1). 
Economic freedom is a core principle that separates left and right on the economic dimension 
of party competition. Kitschelt and Rehm (2014: 1671) summarize the left-right divide with the 
following question: “Should the polity authoritatively (re)allocate resources in an egalitarian 
fashion to all members or should privilege or the spontaneous inequality of the market place 
have free reign and govern the acquisitiveness of members?”2 
Potrafke (2010a: 136) describes the Austrian School of Economics by Ludwig von 
Mises and Friedrich von Hayek, and the Chicago School by Milton Friedman, as the main 
philosophical champions of economic freedom. The Austrian and Chicago schools of thought 
have a lasting impact on the political ideas held by the political right, as evidenced by Margaret 
Thatcher's or Ronald Reagan's admiration for Friedman or Hayek (Jones 2014).3  
As a consequence of the continuously decline of the size of the working class, the left 
needed to adapt its economic program to attract new voters among the middle class (Kitschelt 
1994; Bartolini 2000; Arndt 2014). Full-time working women and higher educated sociocultural 
                                                          
2 Kitschelt and Rehm (2014) argue that the types of preferences that drive political behavior and left-right 
polarization can be categorized into group (identity), grid (governance), and greed (distribution or economic 
policy-making). This study focuses on the left-right polarization of mainstream parties on the economic greed 
dimension. Whether this distinction applies for the group and grid dimensions is beyond the scope of the paper.  
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professionals in public service sector jobs have become core supporters of left-wing parties 
(Iversen and Rosenbluth 2006; Kitschelt and Rehm 2014). Programmatically, the left appeals 
to their new constituents by promoting the provision of public sector jobs, and by emphasizing 
active state policies, such as government investment in education and vocational skills (Iversen 
and Stephens 2008; Häusermann et al. 2013: 226-8). The left also embraces business and labor 
market regulations in order to address social risks that their electorate is facing. Regulatory 
proposals range from laws protecting full-time employees from their dismissal (Rueda 2007) to 
fostering child care facilities and parental leave policies (Häusermann 2006). Left-wing cultural 
values also spill over into the economic realm as most left-wing parties support tougher 
employment regulation through gender quotas or anti-discrimination laws (Terjesen et al. 
2015).  
 
These left-wing policies are hardly in accordance with the principle of economic 
freedom. Consequently, Even though mainstream left-wing parties have accepted or initiated 
some free-market reforms – such as Anthony Blair’s Labour government in the UK or Gerhard 
Schröder’s leftist red-green coalition in Germany – there should be on average be a significant 
reduction in economic freedom when the left governs.  
 
III. 2. Modifying the Economic Freedom of the World Index 
The EFW Index by the Fraser Institute is considered to be the gold standard to measure 
economic freedom (Dawson 2007: 185). Most scholar utilize the EFW Index as the main 
explanatory variable to evaluate whether economic freedom can explain desirable outcomes. 
For instance, they demonstrate find a positive association of economic freedom with economic 
development (Gwartney et al. 2006), democratic institutions (Peev and Mueller 2012), social 
trust (Berggren and Jordahl 2006), and tolerance (Berggren and Nilsson 2013).  
Only a few studies examine the influence of government ideology on economic freedom. 
On the federal level, right-wing government ideology is associated with more freedom on labor 
markets in American and Canadian states (Bjørnskov and Potrafke 2012, 2013) and with 
economic freedom in Western German states (Potrafke 2013). But there is only one time-series 
cross-sectional analysis of the relationship between the EFW Index and government ideology: 
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Pitlik (2007) uses five-year averages for 23 OECD countries to show that right-wing 
governments are relatively more supportive of economic freedom over the period 1970-2000. 
It is, however, necessary to modify Pitlik (2007)’s work and to re-examine the 
relationship between economic freedom and government ideology for three reasons:  
First, his period of observation ranges from 1970 to 2000 and thereby conflates the early 
decades, for which the literature considers government ideology to be relevant, with the period, 
for which many political economists dispute the influence of government ideology. This study 
aims to focus solely on the early 21st century to evaluate whether government ideology has 
recently retired to the background. 
Second, using five-year averages does not capture the effects of government ideology if 
the composition of government changes more frequently. Specifically, five-year averages 
cannot exclude the possibility of an inverse partisan effect. For instance, let u’s assume that a 
country has a right-wing government at period t and that the administration does not change 
economic freedom; the left wins the election at t+3 and strongly increases economic freedom 
in the next year. Averaging over five years yields a dominant right-wing government 
composition and a net increase in economic freedom, thereby falsely confirming the partisan 
hypothesis. The limited availability of data forced Pitlik (2007) to rely on five-year averages, 
because the Fraser Institute publishes their EFW Index only annually since 2000.  
Third, Pitlik (2007) employs the complete EFW Index score as dependent variable. But 
the recent delegation of policy competences implies that national governments do not have full 
authority on all areas of economic policy-making anymore. In a similar case, Potrafke (2013)’s 
analysis of economic freedom in German states adjusts the economic freedom index to exclude 
policy areas for which the federal states have limited or no authority. 
As a consequence of the discussed limitations, this study extends the annual period of 
observation from 2000 to 2012 to evaluate whether government ideology still matters in an era 
of austerity and globalization, and to exclude the possibility of inverse partisan effects. It 
modifies the EFW Index to only include 1) policy areas that national governments generally 
control, and 2.) policy areas that exhibit ideological polarization between mainstream left and 
right. 
<<< TABLE 1 >>> 
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Table 1 graphically summarizes shows the modification of the EFW Index. The EFW 
Index consists of five equally weighted policy areas: Size of Government; Legal System and 
Security of Property Rights; Sound Money; Freedom to Trade Internationally; and Credit, 
Labor, and Business Regulation.  
“Size of Government” includes government consumption, transfers and subsidies, 
privatization and government investment, and income and payroll taxes. National governments 
have not delegated competences to external institutions and parties differ ideologically for the 
desired scope and size of government. “Size of Government” consequently remains in the 
modified EFW Index. 
However, this is not the case for Areas 2 to 4. A left-right conflict for Area 2 “Legal 
System and Security of Property Rights” has disappeared since virtually all mainstream left-
wing parties accept secure property rights. The other items of Area 2 appear to be desirable 
outcomes such as sound law enforcement and keeping the military out of politics. They are 
issues of valence competition, but not of programmatic disagreement. Consequently, Area 2 is 
not part of the modified EFW Index. 
The large mainstream parties could still have different preferences for monetary and 
trade policies of Areas 3 and 4, but domain authority for both areas has largely been delegated 
to external institutions. Most countries have adopted independent central banks, or completely 
given up national monetary policy as in the case of the European Central Bank (Arnone et al. 
2007). The delegation and conduct of monetary policy does not appear to be statistically related 
to partisanship (Way 2000; Gilardi 2007; Jäger 2016). The introduction of the euro was largely 
supported by all mainstream parties and rather caused preference divergence between the 
political elite and the general public, particularly in Germany (Jäger 2013: 117-8). Similarly, 
tariffs, capital controls, and travel restrictions have been abolished within the EU. Bilateral or 
general trade agreements often regulate the ability of administrations to impose new tariffs and 
restrictions. As governments cannot substantially alter economic freedom in Area 3 “Sound 
Money” and Area 4 “Freedom to Trade,” both areas are removed from the modified EFW index. 
Area 5 refers to the regulation of capital, labor and business. Governments still have the 
capacity to shape business and labor market regulation. An expert survey indicates that left- and 
right-wing parties substantially differ in their preferences regarding regulation across different 
sectors (Benoit and Laver 2006). Thus, the modified EFW index includes business and labor 
market regulation. 
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Parties could disagree over the regulation of credit markets, but national governments 
have limited say in this area. The interest rate policy by the central bank and the course of the 
business cycle strongly patterns can influence the score for credit regulation. For instance, the 
Great Recession caused a drastic drop in the score for most countries – suggesting that 
governments can play a minor role at best in influencing the score. As a consequence, the 
modified EFW index does not include credit market regulation. 
<<< FIGURE 1 >>> 
The modified EFW Index consists of the three equally weighted areas “Size of 
Government”, “Labor Market Regulation” and “Business Regulation” and is multiplied by 10 
to range from 0 (the least economic freedom) to 100 (highest economic freedom). The inclusion 
of policy areas is in line with an expert survey, which finds that national governments of EU 
members have at least some degree of influence in economic development and planning and 
social/industrial policy (Hooghe and Marks 2001). Additionally, Nanou and Dorussen (2013) 
confirm that the ideological distance between parties has dwindled in policy areas that are 
increasingly under the realm of the EU. 
Figure 1 shows the development of the modified EFW Index and the three sub-areas 
since the 1990s. Economic freedom strongly increases inacross all areas in the first years of the 
21st century, but the three areas subsequently diverge. While economic freedom in Labor 
Regulation increases slightly, it decreases for Size of Government and Business Regulation; 
overall economic freedom reaches its highest value in 2005 and remains stagnant until 2012.  
 
IV. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
IV. 1. Data overview and some anecdotal evidence 
The study covers the following 36 OECD or new European Union member states from 
2000 to 2012: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
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Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, 
Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK, and the USA.4  
I use the first differences of the modified EFW Index as dependent variable to control 
for autocorrelation. Armingeon et al. (2014)’s Comparative Political Data Set III (2014) 
provides the partisan measurement as main explanatory variable. “Government Ideology” is 
based on the composition of cabinet posts, ranging from one to five. The categories of 
“Government Ideology” are the following: Hegemony of right-wing (and centrister) parties 
(percentage left cabinet posts=0), dominance of right-wing (and centrister) parties (left<33.3), 
balance of power between left and right/center (33.3<left<66.6), dominance of social-
democratic and other left parties (left>66.6), hegemony of social-democratic and other left-
wing parties (left=100). The correlation coefficient between the modified EFW Index and 
Government Ideology is -0.23. 
<<< FIGURE 2 >>> 
Figure 2 shows the mean changes in economic freedom for each five categories of 
Government Ideology.  Hegemonic right-wing governments have the highest value with an 
average annual increase in economic freedom of 1.02 points. The remaining values are not 
categorically decreasing as a balanced government (0.69) has a higher score than a dominant 
right-wing government (0.50), and a hegemonic left-wing government (0.07) exceeds a 
dominant left-wing government (-0.12).  
Figure 2 suggests that economic freedom remains rather stagnant under left-wing 
governments and increases under a right-wing administration. A t-test ofn means shows that 
hegemonic and dominant left-wing governments differ significantly in changing economic 
freedom: Grouping both leftist government types together yields a mean of -0.02 for changes 
in economic freedom, while the average annual change for all other government types is 0.82. 
The difference is significant with a t-value of 2.26 aton the 95 percent confidence level. 
Alternative categorizations that are based on a leftist government portfolio of at least 50 or 34 
percent are also significant different from other, non-leftist government types.5  
                                                          
4 The analysis does not include the OECD member states Chile, Israel, Mexico, South Korea, and Turkey, because 
they are not part of the Comparative Political Data Set III. 
5 The average change in economic freedom for governments with a leftist government portfolio of at least 50 (34) 
percent is 0.05 (0.15) while it is 0.85 (0.92) for all other government types. The differences are significant at the 
95 percent confidence level with a t-value of 2.29 (2.33). 
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Some anecdotal evidence also could suggests that left and right tend to differ 
significantly from each other in their mean economic freedom scoreeconomic policy-making. 
Under the hegemonic left-wing governments of Portugal and Spain, changes in economic 
freedom were always negative between 2005 and 2010, with an overall reduction of about five 
and eight points. In Austria, the right-wing “ÖVP-FPÖ government has pursued particularly 
rapid rate of privatisation” (Hofbauer 2006: 16), leading to more economic freedom of over 
seven points between 2002 and 2005. And in Australia, the right-wing Howard administration 
increased economic freedom by over 12 points between 2000 and 2007. Howard enacted labor 
market deregulation that has been described as “the most fundamental recasting of the industrial 
relations system in over 100 years” (Hall 2006: 291) – until Rudd’s Labor Party returned to 
power and overturned this reform, reducing overall economic freedom by nearly seven points 
until 2012. Similarly, right-wing governments in Slovakia (2004), the Czech Republic (2007), 
and Hungary (2011) increased their economic freedom score by about six, three, and one 
point(s) in just one year by introducing a flat tax regime. As a first re-election measure, the 
Slovakian left-wing government brought a progressive income tax scheme back into effect in 
January 2013.  
There are also cases in which left-wing parties have accepted or initiated some free-
market reforms, such as Anthony Blair’s Labour government in the UK or Gerhard Schröder’s 
leftist red-green coalition in Germany. By contrast, a general minimum wage – traditionally 
championed by left-wing parties – was introduced 2015 in Germany by Angela Merkel’s grand 
coalition. Nonetheless, the concept of economic freedom had a much greater impact on the 
political ideas held by the political right, as evidenced by Margaret Thatcher's or Ronald 
Reagan's admiration for Milton Friedman or Friedrich von Hayek (Jones 2014).6 
Potrafke (2010a: 136) describes the Austrian School of Economics by Ludwig von 
Mises and Friedrich von Hayek, and the Chicago School by Milton Friedman, as the main 
philosophical champions of economic freedom. The Austrian and Chicago schools of thought 
have a lasting impact on the political ideas held by the political right, as evidenced by Margaret 
Thatcher's or Ronald Reagan's admiration for Friedman or Hayek (Jones 2014).7  
                                                          
6 More examples of governing politicians who explicitly refer to the Austrian or Chicago free-market schools, or 
were awarded by free-market think tanks include, but are not limited to, John Howard (Australia), Stephen Harper 
(Canada), Václav Klaus (Czech Rep.), Anders Fogh Rasmussen in early writing (Denmark), Andrus Ansip, Mart 
Laar (Estonia), Sauli Niinistö (Finland), Jean-Pierre Raffarin (France), Valdis Dombrovskis (Latvia),  Leszek 
Balcerowicz (Poland), Mikuláš Dzurinda, Ivan Mikloš, and Robert Sulik (Slovakia). 
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IV. 2. Model specification and empirical analysis 
The empirical analysis is based on the following regression equation: 
∆ 𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝐹𝑊 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐼𝑑𝑒𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑦𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 +
𝑀
𝑗=0
𝜋𝑖 +  𝜏𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
(1) with i = 1, …, 36 (number of countries); t = 1, …, 12 (number of years); j = 0, …, 
M (number of other explanatory variables) 
 
where “∆ Modified EFW Index” measures the first differences of the modified EFW 
Index and is the dependent variable, while “Government Ideology” denotes the main 
explanatory variable.  
“∑ 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡” contains other explanatory variables as controls. The International Country 
Risk Guide provides a measurement for government stability and public popularity, as 
governments could shy away from economic reforms if they have to face falling approval rates. 
The variable “Government Stability” combines the three subcomponents government unity, 
legislative strength, and popular support,8 which ranges from 0 to 12. 
 Moreover, effective domestic veto players can also restrict governments from enacting 
economic reforms (Tsebelis 1995). Hallerberg and Basinger (1998: 339) show that a high 
number of veto players leads to a status quo bias in tax policies. The Political Constraints Index 
5 by Henisz (2000) accounts for “Veto Players” within the executive, two legislative chambers, 
the federal level, and the judiciary. “Veto Players” potentially ranges from 0 to 1. The dummy 
“Government Change” indicates whether there was a turnover in government in a given year. 
”EU” denotes whether a country is a member of the European Union. 
                                                          
8 The International Country Risk Guide does not separately provide the three subcomponents as individual 
measurements. 
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The next variables relate to external constraints. First differences of Dreher (2006b)’s 
KOF Index of Globalization combine social, political, and economic dimensions to provide a 
comprehensive measurement for globalization. And the analysis includes the first differences 
of the following domestic economic constraints: real GDP per capita in thousand US$, 
unemployment rate, national debt, as drawn from the World Bank Global Development 
Indicators. Additionally, the level of the EFW Index at t-1 is used as a control variable to capture 
converging trends. Table 2 depicts shows the descriptive statistics of all variables and their first 
differences. 
<<< TABLE 2 >>> 
“ 𝜋𝑖” denotes country fixed effects to control for country-specific time-invariant effects, 
such as national culture, federalism, the electoral or monetary systems; “𝜏𝑡” represents annual 
time effects to adjust for common positive or negative shocks; “𝜀𝑖𝑡” is the error term. The model 
specification is based on an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression with robust standard errors 
because the Breusch-Pagan test rejected the hypothesis of homoskedasticity.  
It is possible, however, that government ideology has a time-delayed effect on economic 
freedom, and that some explanatory variables, such as GDP per capita or unemployment, might 
be affected by economic freedom. As a consequence, all explanatory variables are lagged by t-
1 one year in additional model specifications in order to tackle potential time-lags and reverse 
causality issues.  
<<< TABLE 3 >>> 
Table 3 summarizes the regression results for five different models. The first model 
includes only Government Ideology as main explanatory variable and fixed and period effects. 
The second and third models add the other explanatory variables and the lagged level of 
economic freedom as controls. Models 4-6 re-examine the previous specifications with lagging 
the explanatory variables by t+1 one year to tackle potential endogeneity problems. Government 
Ideology has a negative sign and is statistically significant at the 99 percent confidence level in 
columns (1), (2), (3), and (6), at the 95 percent confidence level in column (4), and at the 90 
percent confidence level in column (5), indicating that left-wing governments are significantly 
more likely to restrict economic freedom.9   
                                                          
9 The appendix also confirms the empirical results of Table 3 with dependent and continuous explanatory variables 
in levels based on a general least squares Prais-Winsten transformation with a first order autoregressive process 
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The significant negative coefficient for the lagged level of economic freedom suggests 
that countries with already high levels of economic freedom are associated with negative 
changes. Among the other variables measuring various constraints on government, none 
significantly affects economic freedom in all models; there is some evidence that EU 
membership has a positive influence on economic freedom when not controlling for the 
previous EFW level. Government Stability only appears to be conducive for economic freedom 
when it is lagged by one year in the full model. The results are mixed for the coefficient of 
changes in globalization. It is significantly positive but becomes significantly negative when 
the explanatory variables are lagged by one year.  
The numerical effect of Government Ideology appears to be quite large: A unit change 
in Government Ideology towards the left decreases the first differences of economic freedom 
by 0.19 to 0.36 points across the different model specifications, which equals about 5.7 to 10.7 
percent of a standard deviation. Moving from a hegemonic right-wing to a hegemonic left-wing 
government reduces annual average changes in economic freedom by about 0.76 to 1.44 points, 
or by 22.6 to 43 percent of a standard deviation.  
More evidence on the numerical effects of Government Ideology is obtained by relying 
on King et al. (2000)’s simulation-based approach. The Stata-software package Clarify utilizes 
the results of the multiple regression analyses of Model 3 of Table 3 to draw 1000 sets of 
simulated coefficients from each posterior distribution to account for estimation uncertainty 
(Tomz et al. 2003). Government Ideology is set at one of its five values while all other 
explanatory variables are fixed at their means, yielding five counterfactual scenarios for the 
numerical effect of hegemonic right, dominant right, balanced, dominant left, and hegemonic 
left governments on the first differences of economic freedom. 
<<< FIGURE 3 >>> 
Figure 3 plots the density estimates for the five counterfactual scenarios over the first 
differences of economic freedom. As government ideology becomes more left-wing, the density 
estimates move to the left, indicating that left-wing governments tend to reduce economic 
                                                          
(AR1), which accounts for the serial correlation of the dependent variable. The Prais-Winsten transformation 
provides a robustness test for the long-term effects of government ideology on economic freedom (Plümper et al. 
2005: 349). Additional tests show that Government Ideology is not conditional on other factors, such as the age of 
the government, government stability, or veto players, across all model specifications. An interaction term between 
Government Ideology and age of government is significantly positive at the 95 percent confidence interval for the 
model specifications of columns (4) and (5); an interaction term between Government Ideology and veto players 
is significantly negative at the 95 percent confidence interval for column (5). 
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freedom. On average, hegemonic left-wing governments reduce the first differences of 
economic freedom by 0.30 points, and its the density estimate is relatively steeper than the other 
distributions, which suggests that the outcome variation among hegemonic left-wing 
governments  in changing economic freedom is relatively larger. The average increases in first 
differences of economic freedom is are 0.04 for dominant left governments, 0.39 for balanced 
governments, 0.74 for dominant right governments, and 1.08 for hegemonic right governments. 
Thus, the average simulated difference between hegemonic left and right governments is about 
1.38 points of the annual changes in economic freedom. As the density estimates for hegemonic 
left and right governments are not overlapping, we can confirm this numerical difference with 
a high degree of certainty (King et al. 2000: 357). 
<<< TABLE 4 >>> 
In order to evaluate whether a group of countries drives the significant results of 
Government Ideology, Table 4 divides the data into several subsamples based on membership 
in the Eurozone, and on electoral system. Eurozone membership might be another constraint 
thwarting government ideology (Crum 2013), as southern Eurozone members, in particular, 
have limited capacities to fulfill their electoral promises since the advent of the euro crisis 
(Crum 2013).. In the case of the electoral system the dominance of government ideology might 
be stronger in Australia, Canada, France, Japan, Lithuania, UK and USA, because countries 
with plurality formulas tend to produce two-party systems with one governing party. The 
proportional rules of the other countries, in contrast, tend to lead to multi-party systems with 
coalition governments coalitions.  
Table 4 shows that the coefficient for Government Ideology stays significant in all 
subsamples with contemporaneous and lagged explanatory variables. The findings of Table 4 
suggest that a cluster of countries does not drive the negative association between left-wing 
government and economic freedom. 
As another robustness test, Table 5 replaces the dependent variable with the first 
differences of alternative measurements of economic freedom to examine if the empirical 
results are a result of selection bias caused by modifying the EFW Index in section 3.2. Models 
1-4 adjust the weighting of the three sub-areas of the modified EFW Index in the following 
way: Models 1-2: Size of Government (1/2), Business Regulation (1/4) and Labor Regulation 
(1/4); Models 3-4: Size of Government (4/6 to account for each of its four subareas), Business 
Regulation (1/6) and Labor Regulation (1/6).  
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Models 5-6 are based on the original EFW Index. Using the first differences of the 
original EFW Index as dependent variable is a strong robustness test for the validity of the 
partisan hypothesis because national governments have only limited or no authority to directly 
influence the remaining policy areas of the EFW Index. These previously excluded areas 
account for 2/3 of the weighting of the original EFW Index. 
Table 5 shows that Government Ideology remains significantly negative in the first four 
model specifications. The results indicate that the negative relationship between left-wing 
partisanship and economic freedom is robust for weighting changes in the composition of the 
modified EFW Index. While the coefficient for Government Ideology shrinks in Models 5 and 
6, the coefficient remains significant at the 99 and 90 percent confidence level. 
Overall, the robustness tests tend to confirm the continuing influence of government 
ideology on economic policy-making.  
<<< TABLE 5 >>> 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
The influence of government ideology on economic policies remains vitally important 
for democratic legitimacy and government accountability, leading to recurring interest on in 
how government ideology leaves its programmatic footprint in the economy. 
In the “Golden Age” of the welfare state,N national governments had the sovereignty 
and fiscal capacity to shape monetary and welfare policies according to their ideological 
manifestos until the 1980s(Esping-Andersen 1996). But expanding global markets, the shift to 
a postindustrial society, and tightening fiscal conditions have distinctively changed party 
politics in recent decades. International organizations such as the EU have increasingly 
encroached on the national sovereignty of economic policy-making; delegating monetary policy 
to independent central banks has become a global trend. Fiscal constraints have forced many 
governments to cut back on social benefits and restructure the welfare state, sometimes even 
orchestrated by leftist administrations. In fact, a significant portion of the left-wing spectrum 
has fully embraced free trade and central bank independence. But on the other hand, the left 
continues to share a commitment for active state policies that effectively restrict economic 
freedom relative to policies by right-wing parties. 
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But this does not imply And thus, it would be wrong to conclude thatthat partisanship is 
generally retrenching. The empirical section shows that government ideology still matters for 
economic policy-making when using a comprehensive measurement that includes government 
consumption, transfers, subsidies, privatization, government investment, tax policies and labor 
and business regulation from the EFW Index. As the partisan hypothesis suggests, left-wing 
administrations still tend to be more active in restricting economic freedom. 
What could explain the persistent influence of government ideology? The disappearing 
partisan effect in some domains could have actually fostered a distinct partisan effect in other 
policy areas. Delegating monetary policy and restructuring the welfare state could have freed 
up the financial and political capital that governing parties need to impose their program on 
other areas of the economy (Dellepiane-Avellaneda 2013). 
Nonetheless, it is possible that the partisan effect could vanish in the future under 
pressures for further delegation and policy coordination. Particularly, southern Eurozone 
members increasingly have limited capacities to conduct autonomous economic policies since 
they were required to adopt austerity measures after the advent of the euro crisis.  If this trend 
continues, the capacity to formulate and pursue national policies that reflect a political party's 
constituency could vanish altogether.The shift to new economic policies might have been an 
electoral necessity, particularly for the mainstream left. The ongoing shift to a postindustrial 
economy in the OECD and Europe has affected the composition of their electorate: The working 
class voting bloc has become less important for left-wing parties, which needed to adopt their 
program to successfully appeal to new middle-class voters. But it would be mistaken to believe 
that voter realignment has generated left-wing policy proposals that are similar to those 
preferred by the political right. In fact, both old and new left-wing agendas continue to share a 
commitment for active state policies that effectively restrict economic freedom relative to 
policies by right-wing parties. 
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Figure 1 
Average development of modified EFW economic freedom indexIndex and of the three policy 
areas 
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Figure 2 
Mean changes in modified economic freedom index EFW Index based on government 
ideology 
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Figure 3 
Simulated effects of Government Ideology on first differences in economic freedom 
 
26 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 
 
Modifying the EFW Indexeconomic freedom index: Which should be considered? 
 
 Controlled by 
national 
government? 
Mainstream party 
polarization? 
Part of 
Modified EFW 
Index? 
Area 1 
Size of Government 
Government Consumption 
Transfers and Subsidies 
Privatization and 
Government Investment 
Tax Rates 
 
 
 
✓ 
 
 
 
✓ 
 
 
✓ 
Area 2 
Legal System and 
Property Rights 
 
 
✓ 
 
 
 
 
Area 3 
Sound Money 
 
 
 
 
✓ 
 
 
Area 4 
Freedom to Trade 
Internationally 
 
 
 
 
✓ 
 
 
Area 5a 
Credit Market 
Regulation 
 
 
 
 
✓ 
 
 
Area 5b    
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Labor Market 
Regulation 
 
✓ ✓ ✓ 
Area 5c 
Business Regulation 
 
✓ 
 
✓ 
 
✓ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 
 
Descriptive statistics 
 
 Obs Min Max Mean Std. dev. 
Mod. EFW Index 428 41.05 80.28 61.40 7.86 
∆ EFW Index 424 -12.42 11.96 0.60 3.35 
Government Ideology 431 1 5 2.40 1.45 
Government Stability 432 4.04 11.08 8.19 1.32 
Veto Player 432 0.34 0.89 0.77 0.08 
Government Change 432 0 1 0.26 0.44 
EU 432 0 1 0.65 0.47 
KOF Globalization Index 432 58.93 92.37 80.52 7.57 
∆ KOF Globalization Index 432 -4.80 10.61 0.26 1.52 
GDP per Capita 432 2.94 86.13 30.20 18.17 
∆ GDP per Capita 432 -6.01 4.02 0.30 0.94 
Unemployment 432 1.8 25.2 7.79 3.97 
∆ Unemployment 432 -5.4 9.70 0.13 1.56 
Debt 424 7.31 218.80 60.95 36.55 
∆ Debt 423 -15.33 48.93 1.92 6.20 
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Table 3 
 
OLS regression analyses. Dependent variable: First differences in modified economic freedom 
index 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Government Ideology  
 
-0.30*** 
[2.91] 
-0.27*** 
[2.60] 
-0.35*** 
[3.74] 
-0.20** 
[2.06] 
-0.19* 
[1.81] 
-0.36*** 
[3.97] 
Government Stability  0.03 
[0.28] 
0.15 
[1.44] 
 0.12 
[0.96] 
0.32*** 
[2.68] 
Veto Player  -1.07 
[0.50] 
-1.86 
[1.05] 
 -1.83 
[0.76] 
-2.93 
[1.33] 
Government Change  -0.07 
[0.23] 
-0.17 
[0.67] 
 0.22 
[0.75] 
-0.00 
[0.01] 
EU  0.40 
[0.53] 
1.83*** 
[2.92] 
 0.10 
[0.15] 
1.66*** 
[2.91] 
∆ Globalization  0.32** 
[2.56] 
0.20** 
[2.19] 
 -0.24*** 
[2.66] 
-0.21** 
[2.49] 
∆ GDP per Capita  0.15 
[0.99] 
0.28** 
[2.11] 
 -0.21 
[1.48] 
0.03 
[0.26] 
∆ Unemployment  -0.03 
[0.36] 
-0.01 
[0.17] 
 0.12 
[1.15] 
0.08 
[0.86] 
∆ Debt  -0.01 
[0.55] 
-0.00 
[0.10] 
 -0.03 
[1.36] 
-0.03* 
[1.79] 
Level of Economic Freedom t-1   -0.42*** 
[8.65] 
  -0.46*** 
[8.77] 
       
Lagged Explanatory Variables No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 423 415 415 424 415 415 
R-Squared  0.6026 0.6214 0.7201 0.5969 0.6135 0.7244 
* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Absolute t-values in brackets.  
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Table 4  
 
Robustness tests – OLS regression analysis for different subsamples. Dependent variable: 
First differences in modified economic freedom index 
 
 Eurozone Member Electoral System 
 Yes Yes No No Plural Plural Prop. Prop. 
Government Ideology  
 
-0.34** 
[2.13] 
-0.42*** 
[2.78] 
-0.33*** 
[2.99] 
-0.34*** 
[2.93] 
-0.43*** 
[2.80] 
-0.32* 
[1.72] 
-0.32*** 
[2.98] 
-0.37*** 
[3.33] 
Government Stability 0.10 
[0.53] 
0.17 
[0.80] 
0.22* 
[1.73] 
0.46*** 
[3.01] 
0.19 
[1.34] 
0.53*** 
[2.80] 
0.05 
[0.40] 
0.22 
[1.43] 
Veto Player 0.21 
[0.11] 
-1.06 
[0.41] 
-5.71 
[1.24] 
-8.81* 
[1.90] 
2.30 
[0.13] 
13.00 
[0.40] 
-2.26 
[1.19] 
-3.70* 
[1.66] 
Government Change -0.17 
[0.52] 
-0.29 
[0.82] 
-0.10 
[0.28] 
-0.02 
[0.06] 
-0.07 
[0.14] 
-0.09 
[0.16] 
-0.15 
[0.53] 
0.06 
[0.22] 
EU   2.31*** 
[3.34] 
2.05*** 
[3.13] 
4.45*** 
[3.58] 
4.37*** 
[2.67] 
1.43** 
[2.13] 
1.30** 
[2.08] 
∆ Globalization 0.02 
[0.22] 
-0.07 
[0.69] 
0.34*** 
[2.97] 
-0.29*** 
[3.02] 
0.18 
[1.08] 
-0.03 
[0.19] 
0.22** 
[2.29] 
-0.23** 
[2.39] 
∆ GDP per Capita 0.14 
[1.00] 
0.04 
[0.27] 
0.53** 
[2.19] 
0.02 
[0.10] 
0.28 
[0.61] 
-0.60 
[1.40] 
0.35** 
[2.35] 
0.08 
[0.54] 
∆ Unemployment -0.29* 
[1.96] 
-0.00 
[0.03] 
0.09 
[0.80] 
0.04 
[0.35] 
-0.21 
[1.44] 
0.22 
[1.34] 
-0.12 
[1.39] 
-0.00 
[0.04] 
∆ Debt 0.00 
[0.07] 
-0.03 
[0.70] 
-0.03 
[0.91] 
-0.04 
[1.64] 
-0.02 
[0.28] 
-0.13** 
[2.25] 
0.01 
[0.23] 
-0.02 
[1.04] 
Level of Economic Freedom t-1 -0.56*** 
[6.81] 
-0.60*** 
[7.03] 
-0.45*** 
[7.73] 
-0.48*** 
[7.75] 
-0.29*** 
[3.44] 
-0.44*** 
[4.30] 
-0.46*** 
[8.19] 
-0.49*** 
[8.12] 
         
Lagged Expl. Variables No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 163 164 252 251 86 86 329 329 
R-Squared  0.7856 0.7798 0.7360 0.7355 0.8715 0.8693 0.7125 0.7112 
* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Absolute t-values in brackets.  
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Table 5  
 
Robustness tests – using first differences of other economic freedom indices as dependent 
variable 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Government Ideology  
 
-0.31*** 
[3.06] 
-0.33*** 
[3.47] 
-0.26** 
[2.244] 
-0.32*** 
[2.89] 
-0.16*** 
[2.83] 
-0.10* 
[1.77] 
Government Stability 0.20* 
[1.75] 
0.33** 
[2.48] 
0.26* 
[1.87] 
0.32** 
[2.02] 
-0.07 
[0.93] 
0.09 
[1.08] 
Veto Player -2.89 
[1.31] 
-3.66 
[1.53] 
-4.24 
[1.48] 
-4.83* 
[1.74] 
0.45 
[0.36] 
-1.68 
[1.53] 
Government Change -0.16 
[0.59] 
-0.05 
[0.18] 
-0.22 
[0.66] 
0.02 
[0.07] 
-0.05 
[0.34] 
0.16 
[0.90] 
EU 1.63** 
[2.27] 
1.43** 
[2.35] 
1.02 
[1.07] 
1.00 
[1.32] 
1.49*** 
[2.76] 
0.69 
[1.36] 
∆ Globalization 0.16* 
[1.89] 
-0.22*** 
[2.62] 
0.13 
[1.39] 
-0.22** 
[2.42] 
0.20*** 
[2.91] 
-0.08 
[1.36] 
∆ GDP per Capita 0.30** 
[2.03] 
0.07 
[0.44] 
0.34* 
[1.94] 
0.07 
[0.40] 
0.09 
[1.22] 
-0.02 
[0.19] 
∆ Unemployment -0.01 
[0.12] 
0.07 
[0.75] 
-0.02 
[0.24] 
0.05 
[0.50] 
-0.03 
[0.62] 
0.01 
[0.10] 
∆ Debt -0.01 
[0.53] 
-0.04** 
[1.98] 
-0.02 
[0.71] 
-0.05** 
[2.03] 
-0.05** 
[2.05] 
-0.03* 
[1.87] 
Level of Economic Freedom t-1 -0.40*** 
[8.75] 
-0.43*** 
[9.17] 
-0.38*** 
[8.00] 
-0.41*** 
[8.32] 
-0.35*** 
[8.14] 
-0.33*** 
[6.89] 
       
Lagged Expl. Variables No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 415 415 405 405 422 422 
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R-Squared  0.6311 0.6383 0.5357 0.5440 0.5652 0.5143 
The weighting of the specifications is the following: 
Models 1-2: Size of Government (1/2), Labor Regulation (1/4), Business Regulation (1/4) 
Models 3-4: Government Consumption (1/6), Transfers and Subsidies (1/6), Privatization and Government 
Investment (1/6), Tax Rates (1/6), Labor Regulation (1/6), Business Regulation (1/6) 
Models 5-6: Original EFW Index: Size of Government (1/5), Legal System and Property Rights (1/5), Sound 
Money (1/5), Freedom to Trade Internationally (1/5), Credit Market Regulation (1/15), Labor Market Regulation 
(1/15), Business Regulation (1/15); * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Absolute t-values in brackets.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX 
 
Appendix Table  
 
GLS Regression analyses. Dependent variable: Level of modified economic freedom index 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Government Ideology  
 
-0.27* 
[1.81] 
-0.31** 
[2.24] 
-0.25** 
[1.97] 
-0.29** 
[2.48] 
Government Stability  0.16 
[1.31] 
 0.45*** 
[3.01] 
Veto Player  -0.05 
[0.01] 
 0.14 
[0.05] 
Government Change  -0.06 
[0.22] 
 0.15 
[0.56] 
EU  0.48 
[0.45] 
 1.74* 
[1.77] 
Globalization  0.40*** 
[4.32] 
 0.14 
[1.52] 
GDP per Capita  0.08 
[0.57] 
 -0.26** 
[1.99] 
Unemployment  -0.09 
[1.09] 
 0.01 
[0.09] 
Debt  -0.06*** 
[3.84] 
 -0.07*** 
[4.02] 
     
Lagged Explanatory Variables No No Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 459 451 460 451 
R-Squared 0.9094 0.9192 0.9092 0.9128 
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A Prais-Winsten transformation (AR1) accounts for serial correlation; * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. 
Absolute t-values in brackets.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
